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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
In this securities fraud class action, the District Court dismissed all claims against 
the corporate defendants and five of the individual defendants. The lead plaintiff appeals. 
We will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 Because we write only for the parties, we set forth only the facts and procedural 
history necessary for our analysis. Horizon Lines, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Horizon Lines, LLC (collectively “Horizon”), are shipping companies. This case is 
bottomed on securities fraud claims that arise out of price fixing in Horizon‟s shipping 
business from the United States to Puerto Rico, which is a limited, oligopolistic market 
that comprised about a third of Horizon‟s business during the time period at issue. 
Horizon held its initial public offering (“IPO”) on September 26, 2005. The price fixing 
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conspiracy became public on April 17, 2008, when the Department of Justice and the FBI 
executed search warrants on Horizon and Horizon issued a statement acknowledging the 
investigation. On April 25, 2008, Horizon announced that “its revenue and earnings were 
not sustainable.” (R. at A-448.) Its stock price plummeted after both announcements.  
There are eight individual defendants in this matter, all of whom hold or held 
management or executive positions at Horizon. Three of them – Gabriel Serra, R. Kevin 
Gill, and Gregory Glova (collectively “Puerto Rico managers”) – pled guilty to price 
fixing in the Puerto Rico market from May of 2002 to April of 2008. No criminal charges 
have been filed against the other five individual defendants: Charles Raymond, Mark 
Urbania, John Keenan, John Handy, and Brian Taylor (collectively “senior executives”). 
After the parties filed their briefs on appeal, Horizon Lines, LLC, itself pled guilty to 
price fixing charges, for which it had respondeat superior liability. 
The Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit is the lead plaintiff in 
this putative securities class action case. In brief, it alleges that defendants made 
statements about Horizon‟s financial health, in particular explaining why Horizon was 
increasing shipping rates and otherwise doing well in a tight Puerto Rico market, and that 
those statements were false because the company‟s apparent well-being in Puerto Rico 
was due to price fixing, not the reasons Horizon and its executives identified.  
The District Court granted the motion of Horizon and the senior executives to 
dismiss all claims in the Amended Consolidated Securities Class Action Complaint 
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(“Amended Complaint”).1 It held that the senior executives made materially false 
statements, but nonetheless dismissed the claims against them because there were 
insufficient allegations to raise a strong inference that they made those false statements 
with scienter. The Court conversely held that the Puerto Rico managers acted with 
scienter, but that they did not make material false statements on which plaintiff relied. As 
to Horizon, the Court concluded that it could not be liable because there were not 
sufficient allegations that an individual defendant both made material false statements, on 




Plaintiff brings its claims pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission‟s Rule 10b-5.3   
                                                 
1
 The District Court previously granted a motion to dismiss the original 
Consolidated Securities Class Action Complaint. The Puerto Rico managers did not file a 
motion to dismiss either complaint, but after the Court granted the motion of Horizon and 
the senior executives to dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Court issued a final 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) in favor of all defendants except the Puerto Rico 
managers. The claims against the Puerto Rico managers remain pending in the District 
Court, where this case is stayed until the resolution of this appeal. 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
3
 In addition to dismissing the claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the District 
Court dismissed plaintiff‟s claims under § 20(a), which “creates a cause of action against 
individuals who exercise control over a „controlled person,‟ including a corporation, that 
has committed a violation of Section 10(b). Accordingly, liability under Section 20(a) is 
derivative of an underlying violation of Section 10(b) by the controlled person.” Inst. 
Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
Because the Court correctly dismissed the § 10(b) claims, we will not further address § 
20(a). 
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To state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must 
“allege defendants made a misstatement or an omission of material fact 
[“material false statement”] with scienter in connection with the purchase or 
the sale of a security upon which plaintiffs reasonably relied and plaintiff‟s 
[sic] reliance was the proximate cause of their injury.” 
 
Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Winer 
Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
We are reviewing the grant of motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. As 
with any motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts pled in the Amended Complaint are 
true, and we “consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts 
ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.” Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A plaintiff alleging securities 
fraud violations, however, “must satisfy the heightened pleading rules codified in the 
PSLRA [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act].” Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252; see also 
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010) (“Indeed, Congress has enacted 
special heightened pleading requirements for the scienter element of § 10(b) fraud 
cases.”). Those heightened pleading rules require that  
the complaint must specify each allegedly misleading statement, why the 
statement was misleading, and, if an allegation is made on information and 
belief, all facts supporting that belief with particularity. Second, the 
complaint must, with respect to each act or omission alleged . . . state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind. 
 
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252-53 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).  
 “Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, and 
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requires a knowing or reckless state of mind.” Id. at 252 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). In this context, the standard for recklessness is high:  
[a] reckless statement is one involving not merely simple, or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers 
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must 
have been aware of it.  
 
Id. at 267 n.42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Allegations akin to corporate 
mismanagement are not sufficient. Id. In analyzing whether there is a strong inference of 
scienter, we  
weigh the plausible nonculpable explanations for the defendant‟s conduct 
against the inferences favoring the plaintiff. A strong inference of scienter 
is one that is cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent. The pertinent question is whether all of the facts 
alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not 
whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that 
standard. 
 
Id. at 267-68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he inference of scienter 
must be more than merely „reasonable‟ or „permissible‟” but “need not be irrefutable.” 
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. This is judged from the perspective of a “reasonable person.” Id. 
at 326. “[O]missions and ambiguities count against inferring scienter.” Id. 
 We substantively agree with the District Court‟s resolution of the defendants‟ 
motions to dismiss. There is no need to retrace all of the ground that the Court so ably 
covered in its lengthy and extraordinarily thorough opinions, and we address below only 
the few issues that merit some further discussion. 
 7 
Our dissenting colleague concludes that the Amended Complaint pled sufficient 
facts to raise a strong inference that the senior executives acted with scienter when they 
made material false statements, and thus that there were sufficient allegations of 
Horizon‟s scienter, as well.4 The dissent notes, for example, that the Puerto Rico market 
was a significant portion of Horizon‟s business, that the conspiracy went on for six years, 
that Urbania left Horizon under unusual circumstances, and that Horizon had an IPO 
during this period, which would have required senior management to take a close look at 
the company‟s finances.  
The dissent focuses not on the District Court‟s analysis of each of these allegations 
but rather on the brevity of the Court‟s explicit discussion of the totality of the facts 
related to scienter. That specific section of the Court‟s opinion was brief, but it followed a 
lengthy discussion as to why each scienter-related allegation added little, if anything, to 
plaintiff‟s side of the scienter scale. The Court did not need to explain at length that the 
total weight of these allegations was also scant. To put it succinctly, it does not take much 
to explain that zero plus zero equals zero.
5
 
                                                 
4
 The dissent appears to agree, as we do, with the District Court‟s conclusion that 
the Puerto Rico managers did not make statements that would be actionable under the 
securities laws. 
5
  Plaintiff and the dissent also highlight two facts from related criminal 
proceedings. In the case against Gill, the government stated that Gill had provided 
evidence against “„his superiors‟” at Horizon, “„including presently uncharged co-
conspirators.‟” (R. at A-446-47.) The government neither named any of these “superiors” 
nor, so far as we know, charged any of them with any crimes. This vague statement is 
insufficient to strengthen the scienter allegations for any individual senior executive. 
After the parties filed their briefs in this appeal, Horizon Lines, LLC, pled guilty to 
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The PSLRA places a weighty burden on plaintiffs, and in accord with the District 
Court, we conclude that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts, when viewed in their 
totality, to raise a strong inference of scienter as to the senior executives. Horizon‟s 
scienter, thus, cannot be based on the scienter of any individual. 
The question remains whether plaintiff may otherwise plead scienter as to Horizon, 
and if so, whether it has done so. The District Court applied the Fifth Circuit‟s approach 
in Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire Insurance Solutions, Inc., in which the court 
recognized that statements of executive officers may be attributed to a corporation when 
they are “made pursuant to their positions of authority within the company.” 365 F.3d 
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004). But with respect to whether a corporation had the scienter to 
make the statements, the Fifth Circuit held that 
it [is] appropriate to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate 
official or officials who make or issue the statement . . . rather than 
generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation‟s officers and 
employees acquired in the course of their employment. 
 
Id. Because there was no individual at Horizon who made actionable statements with 
scienter, the Court concluded that plaintiff had not pled scienter against Horizon. 
 Plaintiff contends, however, that it may plead scienter against the corporation 
without successfully pleading a claim against any individual. It primarily relies on two 
                                                                                                                                                             
antitrust violations. Given Horizon‟s respondeat superior liability, this is an 
unremarkable event, and we will not speculate about the government‟s motivation in 
bringing the charges against Horizon. We have no way of knowing whether the 
government “had information indicating that [Horizon‟s] senior management was 
involved in the conspiracy.” (Dissent, Draft Slip. Op. at 11.)  
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cases, but the facts in both cases are distinguishable from those alleged here, and so we 
will discuss them only briefly. In City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. 
Bridgestone Corp., Bridgestone and its subsidiary Firestone had information that their 
tires were rupturing and causing, among other things, a significant number of rollover 
accidents. 399 F.3d 651, 656-59 (6th Cir. 2005). Bridgestone and Firestone engaged in a 
variety of tactics, such as a large-scale secret settlement with State Farm Insurance Co., to 
keep the scope of the problem from safety regulators in the United States and several 
other countries, as well as from investors. Id. at 658-59. When the truth came out and the 
stock declined, plaintiffs filed a suit under the PSLRA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants but nonetheless held that the 
facts supported scienter for corporate defendants. Id. at 690-91. 
 The alleged wrongdoing in Bridgestone was, however, extraordinary, akin to the 
facts imagined by the Seventh Circuit in this hypothetical:  
Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in 
2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be a strong inference of 
corporate scienter, since so dramatic an announcement would have been 
approved by corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
company to know that the announcement was false. 
 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 Although the price fixing conspiracy at Horizon was long-lasting and affected a 
substantial portion of Horizon‟s business, the facts pled here are a far cry from those in 
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Bridgestone or in the Seventh Circuit‟s hypothetical,6 and we need not decide whether we 
agree with either approach. Even if, however, it were possible to plead scienter against a 
corporation without pleading scienter against an individual, the facts alleged here would 
not survive a motion to dismiss.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
                                                 
6
  For example, it is not as though Horizon did no shipping in the Puerto Rico 
market while claiming that business there was going well. 
City of Roseville Employees‟ Retirement System v. Horizon Lines Inc. 
Nos. 10-2788 & 10-3815 
                                                                                                                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
To state a claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, a plaintiff 
must “allege defendants made a misstatement or omission of material fact with 
scienter in connection with the purchase or the sale of a security upon which 
plaintiffs reasonably relied . . . .”  Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, 564 F.3d 
242, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).  The District Court, 
with which my colleagues have expressed their agreement, held that plaintiffs, 
represented by the Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit 
(“PFRS”), failed to meet this requirement.   
Though it determined that PFRS had alleged sufficient facts to show that 
senior officers of Horizon Lines, Inc. (“Horizon”)—Charles Raymond, M. Mark 
Urbania, John V. Keenan, Brian W. Taylor, and John W. Handy (collectively, the 
“senior executives”)—made false statements on which shareholders of Horizon 
relied, the Court ruled that PFRS failed to show they acted with the requisite 
scienter.  While acknowledging that Gabriel Serra, R. Kevin Gill, and Gregory 
Glova (the “Puerto Rico managers”) had scienter,1 it held that PFRS had not 
alleged sufficient facts to show they made false statements.  Then, applying the 
rule of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Southland Sec. Corp. v. 
                                                 
1 
It was undisputed before us that the Puerto Rico managers had scienter, as they 
were convicted of criminal antitrust violations for their role in the conspiracy and 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment.   
2 
 
INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004) , the District Court 
concluded that, because no strong inference existed that a single Horizon 
employee made a false statement with scienter, PFRS could not survive a motion 
to dismiss as to Horizon itself.  Because I believe that PFRS has alleged facts 
sufficient to support a strong inference that the senior executives made false 
statements with scienter, I think the District Court erred in dismissing PFRS‟s 
amended complaint as to the senior executives and to Horizon.
2
  Thus, I 
respectfully dissent. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act is given content by Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Rule makes it “unlawful 
for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).  To state a 
claim for relief under this section, plaintiffs must plead facts showing that “(1) the 
defendant[s] made a materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a 
material fact necessary to make a statement not misleading; (2) the defendant[s] 
                                                 
2
 PFRS‟s allegations that the senior executives made false statements were 
essentially undisputed before us.  The best Horizon can do is claim that although it 
did not address whether the senior executives made false statements, it “d[id] not 
concede” the point.  Horizon Br. 17.  As I agree with my colleagues and the 
District Court that PFRS has more than adequately satisfied this requirement, and 
Horizon presents no arguments to the contrary, I do not address this further. 
3 
 
acted with scienter; and (3) the plaintiff[s]‟ reliance on the defendant[s]‟ 
misstatement caused [their] injury.”  Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb 
Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d at 251.   
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the “PSLRA”) imposes 
heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs bringing suit under the Securities 
and Exchange Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).  Specifically, with respect to the 
scienter requirement, a plaintiff must allege facts giving rise to a “strong 
inference” of “either reckless or conscious behavior.”  In re Advanta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999).  We have held that the PSLRA 
“obliges courts to weigh the „plausible nonculpable explanations for the 
defendant‟s conduct‟ against the „inferences favoring the plaintiff.‟ . . .  A „strong 
inference‟ of scienter is one that is „cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.‟”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 267 (quoting 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314, 323 (2007) 
(“Tellabs”)).  However, as the Supreme Court has admonished, “[t]he inference 
that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the „smoking-
gun‟ genre, or even the most plausible of competing inferences.‟ . . . The inquiry . 
. . is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong 
inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in 
isolation, meets that standard.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322-24.   
This is where I believe the District Court erred.  In its 50-page opinion, the 
4 
 
Court dedicated a scant one page to its collective analysis of scienter.  As the 
Supreme Court has made clear, we must consider all allegations of scienter 
together.  I agree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that “reviewing 
each allegation individually before reviewing them holistically risks losing the 
forest for the trees.”  Frank v. Dana Corp., 2011 WL 2020717, at *5 (6th Cir. May 
25, 2011). 
Moreover, I believe that PFRS has alleged sufficient facts to raise a strong 
inference that the senior executives acted with scienter.  First, this was not a subtle 
conspiracy.  It persisted for more than six years and involved a shipping market 
that accounted for more than a third of Horizon‟s total revenue.  Although 
shipping volumes in the Puerto Rico market had been declining steadily for more 
than a decade, and Horizon had three competitors for an ever-shrinking customer 
base, it managed to increase its shipping rates, and thus its revenues, every year 
during the class period.  Moreover, the conspiracy spanned Horizon‟s initial public 
offering of its stock, in preparation for which the senior executives assessed the 
company‟s business and financial position.  Against this “array of circumstantial 
evidence” it is hard to believe that five of Horizon‟s most senior officers, 
including the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer, were not at 
least reckless in failing to discover the antitrust conspiracy.  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 
269. 
Second, while we may not infer scienter solely from management‟s 
5 
 
position or “general awareness of the day-to-day workings of the company‟s 
business,” we have held that a corporate officer had scienter as to risky behavior 
by other employees when he was asked about the behavior and denied its 
existence.  Id. at 269-70; see also Makor v. Tellabs, 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“When the facts known to a person place him on notice of a risk, he cannot 
ignore the facts and plead ignorance of the risk.”).  Similarly, in this case, the 
senior executives were pressed repeatedly by perplexed investors about how 
Horizon‟s regular shipping rate increases in Puerto Rico were possible.  In 
response, they credited a variety of reasons, including a stable competitive 
environment, responsible competition, market discipline, customer relationships, 
and good business practices.  PFRS Br. 42-43 (citing A-483-84, 494, 516, 519, 
525, 531-33, 535).  Combined with the nature, scope, and timing of the 
conspiracy, this is, I believe, sufficient to raise a strong inference that the senior 
executives were aware of the anomaly presented by Horizon‟s ever-improving 
financial situation in a declining market, and were, at best, reckless as to the cause.   
The evidence does not end there.  Third, Urbania, Horizon‟s former Chief 
Financial Officer, announced his resignation, departed, and was replaced just two 
weeks prior to Horizon‟s announcement that it was being investigated for antitrust 
violations.  Putting aside the timing of his sudden leaving, Urbania purportedly  
forfeited $4,000,000 in stock options and, contrary to standard company practice, 
did not receive a severance package.  To say that this is not typical politely 
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understates suspicious circumstances deserving, at least, further inquiry.  Indeed, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that scienter may be inferred 
when an executive‟s resignation “was uncharacteristic when compared to the 
defendant‟s typical hiring and termination patterns or was accompanied by 
suspicious circumstances . . . .”  Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 
981, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009).   
One is tempted to say that these allegations, if true, compel further 
investigation if not a finding of scienter.  Yet the District Court concluded that the 
temporal proximity of Urbania‟s resignation to Horizon‟s disclosure was irrelevant 
because the conspiracy and the investigation were covert prior to that 
announcement.  The Court determined that, because it did not allege a more direct 
link, PFRS had “simply . . . not connected Urbania‟s resignation to the price-fixing 
conspiracy.”  A-90.  But, to repeat, a “strong inference” of scienter need only be 
“cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent 
intent.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S at 314.  The District Court did not explore possibly 
benign explanations for Urbania‟s sudden resignation at great personal expense 
(and Horizon doesn‟t offer any).  Taken together, it appears to me that the nature, 
scope, and duration of the conspiracy, the questioning by investors, and Urbania‟s 
resignation establish that it is more likely than not that one or more of the senior 
executives acted with the requisite scienter.   
And there‟s more!  Fourth, PFRS notes that the Government represented in 
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a sentencing memorandum that defendant Gill had “provided evidence, in the form 
of statements and documents, against his superiors within [Horizon], including 
presently uncharged co-conspirators.”  A-446-47 (emphasis added).  PFRS points 
out that it named as defendants all of Gill‟s superiors (including Taylor, to whom 
he reported directly) who were involved with the Puerto Rican market.  The 
District Court dismissed this allegation as “vague” and “speculative at best,” 
stating that PFRS had failed to plead particularized facts regarding scienter and the 
specific role of each defendant in the conspiracy.  A-39.   
Standing alone, I agree this would not be enough to raise a strong inference 
of scienter.  But we are not to view PFRS‟s allegations individually.  Instead, we 
must ask “whether all  of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong 
inference of scienter . . . .”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323 (emphasis in original).  With 
all else alleged, the Government‟s statement that Gill provided evidence of the 
involvement of his superiors in the antitrust conspiracy crosses the divide from 
suspicious to my belief that it is more likely than not Horizon‟s senior executives 
acted with scienter.
3
    
                                                 
3
 PFRS also notes that motive, particularly financial gain, and opportunity “may 
weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference.”  Id. at 325.  PFRS alleges that the 
senior executives acquired substantial stock and stock options in Horizon, some of 
which they sold for millions of dollars in proceeds during the class period, and 
thus had the motive to engage in the conspiracy to inflate the price of Horizon‟s 
stock.  Stock transactions may create an inference of scienter when they are 
“„unusual in scope or timing.‟”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 279 (quoting Advanta, 180 
F.3d at 540).  The stock sales at issue at first blush do not appear to meet that test, 
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In sum, because PFRS‟s allegations are sufficient to raise a strong inference 
of scienter as to the senior executives, I believe the District Court erred in 
dismissing PFRS‟s amended complaint as to them.  
Our sister Courts of Appeals have required different things of plaintiffs to 
survive a motion to dismiss on a § 10(b) claim against a corporation.   In 
Southland, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff must 
plead that at least one individual acting on behalf of the corporation made a false 
statement with the requisite state of mind.  365 F.3d at 367.  This was the 
approach adopted, without discussion, by the District Court.  In contrast, the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted a collective scienter rule, holding that 
“knowledge of a corporate officer or agent acting within the scope of his authority 
is attributable to the corporation.”  City of Monroe Employees Retirement Sys. v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 688 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has applied the principle 
of respondeat superior in analyzing whether an individual defendant‟s scienter 
could be attributed to the corporation, Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 
2008), and has suggested that “it is possible to draw a strong inference of 
corporate scienter without being able to name the individuals who concocted and 
                                                                                                                                                 
as most of them were made pursuant to § 10b5-1 plans, under which corporate 
executives sell predetermined amounts of stock on predetermined dates to avoid 
liability for insider trading.  However, the existence of the § 10b5-1 plans is also 
not exculpatory because the plans were put into place in 2006, after the conspiracy 
began.   
9 
 
disseminated the fraud,” Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710.  Finally, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has offered a helpful reconciliation of the cases:   
When the defendant is a corporate entity, . . . the pleaded facts must 
create a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the 
corporation acted with the requisite scienter.  In most cases, the most 
straightforward way to raise such an inference for a corporate defendant 
will be to plead it for an individual defendant.  But it is possible to raise the 
required inference with regard to a corporate defendant without doing so 
with regard to a specific individual defendant. . . .  Congress has imposed 
strict requirements on securities fraud pleading, but we do not believe they 
have imposed the rule urged by defendants, that in no case can corporate 
scienter be pleaded in the absence of successfully pleading scienter as to an 
expressly named officer. 
   
Teamsters Local 445 Freight v. Dynex Capital, 531 F.3d 190, 195-96 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
Because I believe that PFRS has alleged sufficient facts to show that the 
senior executives made false statements with scienter, and thus satisfied the 
strictest of the tests for corporate scienter (set forth in Southland), I believe that we 
need not reach the question of whether plaintiffs could survive a motion to dismiss 
as to Horizon with something less.     
If all the above is not convincing enough that Horizon‟s motion to dismiss 
should be denied, we have late-breaking news:  Horizon itself pled guilty to 
criminal antitrust violations.  And guess who was excluded from the 





     
Horizon argues that its guilty plea has “no bearing” on whether PFRS has 
adequately pleaded corporate scienter because the standards are different—a 
corporation may be criminally liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if 
any of its employees engage in antitrust activities, while under the securities laws 
a corporation may only be held liable if persons responsible for making false 
statements to the public also had scienter.   
But this argument begs the question of what plaintiffs are required to plead 
to state a claim for corporate scienter.  Even if we were to adopt such a rule, 
Horizon‟s guilty plea, together with the exclusions in the non-prosecution 
agreement, weigh in favor of the scienter of the senior executives.  As PFRS 
points out, “corporations are not charged criminally on the basis of actions of a 
„rogue employee.‟”  PFRS Supp. Br. 2 (quoting United States Attorney‟s Manual 
9-28.500(A)) (emphasis in original).  Rather, “the most important consideration in 
determining whether to charge an entire corporation criminally is the „role and 
conduct of management.‟”  Id. (emphasis in original).   
                                                 
4
 PFRS does not “advocate[e] a rule that a corporate guilty plea, by itself, 
automatically leads to a successful securities fraud complaint.”  PFRS Supp. Br. 4.  
As PFRS acknowledges, “[e]ven where a corporation pleads guilty to criminal 
activities, the plaintiff must also establish that the corporation issued false 
statements inconsistent with the facts admitted in the plea, that the false statements 
were material, the truth was not known to the public, and that revelation  of the 
truth caused the plaintiffs‟ losses.”  Id. (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 339 (2005)).   
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I believe it is more likely than not that the Government chose to pursue 
criminal liability for Horizon, more than two years after the Puerto Rico managers 
were imprisoned for their involvement, because it had information indicating that 
its senior management was involved in the conspiracy.  Gilding the lily is not 
needed here, but there it is.   
In conclusion, because I have no doubt that PFRS‟s allegations are 
sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter as to the senior executives, I 
conclude the District Court erred in dismissing PFRS‟s amended complaint as to 
both the senior executives and Horizon.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more 
compelling confluence of circumstantial evidence in support of this conclusion.  In 
holding that the allegations in this case do not meet the requirements of § 10(b), I 
believe that the majority is demanding precisely what the Supreme Court told it 
not to require—a “smoking-gun.”  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.  Thus I 
respectfully dissent.  
